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AND  CANADIAN  DAIRY SECTORS:  A  SPATIAL ANALYSIS
Andrew M. Novakovic, Maurice Doyon and Phillip  Bishop
This paper presents key results  from two studies recently  completed by members of
the Comell Program on Dairy Markets and Policy.  The study by Maurice Doyon compares
the optimal trade flows of dairy products  and marginal values of  raw milk that are predicted
by a spatial  model of the United States and Canada under conditions of free trade or current
trade restrictions  (Doyon).  The implications of free dairy trade in North America  for the
viability of U.S.  Federal  Milk Marketing Orders  (US  FMMO)  is  explored in  a study by
Phillip Bishop (Bishop).
Both studies employ highly disaggregated  spatial optimization models that represent
the production,  assembly, processing,  distribution, and consumption activities  characteristic
of dairy market operations.  Although very similar in their basic design, the models used in
the two  studies have significant  differences.  The Doyon study  focuses  on the adjoining
regions of the Northeastern United States and the central  Canadian provinces of Ontario and
Quebec, with a much more aggregated  representation of the rest of the United States  and
Canada.  The Bishop model covers  all of North America  in more evenly proportioned detail.
There are also some differences in the level of product aggregation and other details.  In any
case,  both studies can be thought of as drawing on the same conceptual  and mathematical
approach to representing milk and dairy product markets.  Additionally, both studies begin
with  establishing  a  baseline  that  is  predicated  on  current  conditions  of  current  highly
restricted trade between the two countries and include a free trade scenario.  The latter does
not reflect any current policy, nor does it correspond to the requirements under GATT, but
it does provide an estimate of the most unrestricted scenario.
The presentation begins with the Doyon study and concludes with the Bishop study.
Summary conclusions  are presented at the end.Proceedings
FREE  TRADE  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CANADA  WITHOUT
DOMESTIC POLICY COMPLICATIONS
Observers  of the dairy sectors  in the United  States and Canada are  well aware that
both countries employ  an extensive  set of domestic  dairy policies  and  that these policies
differ markedly.  It goes without saying that any sudden liberalization  of trade between the
two  countries  would  be grossly  affected  by  and  have effects  on  these  domestic  policies.
Canada would  find it immensely difficult to maintain  its current  regime of relatively  high
farm prices under its milk marketing quota system and the USFMMO  system would find it
difficult  to  enforce  producer  prices  on  Canadian  shipments  of packaged  milk  to  U.S.
locations.  The latter will be  discussed later  in this paper.  The  issue of the Canadian quota
system  is not studied here.  In  fact,  we take it as a given that free trade must involve either
the elimination of the  quota system or changes  so significant as to render  it irrelevant  in a
free trade analysis.  The key issue is, of course,  achieving price equilibria in markets for raw
milk and dairy products.  Unlike more conventional  studies that might attempt to estimate
changes  in production  and consumption  due to new price equilibria,  this study approaches
the question  of prices  as  the dual solution of an  optimization problem wherein  the primal
deals with production and consumption based on existing levels.  In a sense, the  study looks
at the shorter term implications  for price and leaves the potential impact  on production  and
consumption  for  another  analysis.  In  so  doing,  the  study  obviates  any  need  to  find
appropriate  supply and demand response functions, which in many cases simply do not exist
at a level corresponding to the spatial and product disaggregation  used in the model.  The fact
that  previous  studies  of supply and  demand  response,  as  well  as conventional  wisdom,
suggest that both behaviours  are highly price  inelastic helps to support the robustness of this
approach.
Design  of Trade Liberalization Simulations
A  Base scenario is used as a benchmark  to evaluate the magnitude of the predicted
changes. In the base scenario, all dairy products, except  fluid (beverage)  milk, could move
freely among Canadian regions,  while all dairy products are allowed to move freely within
the Northeast United States.  No dairy product trade is allowed between the United States and
Canada.
The  base  simulation  is a benchmark,  a point of reference.  The  effects that policy
changes  had  on  trade  patterns  are  evaluated  in  terms  of changes  relative  to  the  base
simulation.  The base simulation represented  the economic optimum for the period studied,
notwithstanding  all other factors.
In the Free Trade scenario,  all dairy products,  as  well as raw milk, are permitted to
move freely across the U.S.-Canada border.  Free trade is not likely to occur in the short run.
However, the scenario has two desirable qualities.  One is that  free trade is easy to model.
The  second  is  that  it represents  a normative  upper limit of trade liberalization.  For this
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simulation, all constraints  on the movements of dairy products between the United States and
Canada are removed.  Thus, Quebec and Ontario could export or import any of seven dairy
products, including raw milk, to and from the Northeast.  This is also the case for a Canadian
aggregated excess demand point and a U.S. aggregated excess supply point, which together
represent the rest of the relevant  components of the United States and Canada.
Results of the Base Scenario
The simulation results are expressed  as changes  in quantity trade flows and shadow
prices.  Trade flow maps provide a pictorial view of the results.  To simplify the presentation
of  results,  the  many  supply,  processing,  and  demand  points  in  the  Northeast  US  is
disaggregated  into  five  smaller  multi-state  regions.  Northern  New  England  (NNE)  is
comprised of Vermont, Maine and New Hampshire.  Southern New England (SNE) is made
up of New Jersey,  Rhode  Island, Connecticut,  and Massachusetts.  Maryland,  Washington
D.C.  and  Delaware  formed  the  Middle  Atlantic  (MAT)  region.  New  York  (NY)  and
Pennsylvania  (PA)  are the two  other regions.  Similarly,  Ontario  and  Quebec  points are
aggregated into regions defined by the two provinces-ON and PQ, respectively.  The excess
demand point for the rest of Canada (CAED)  and the excess supply point for the rest of the
United  States (USES) make up the remainder of the model.
Shadow Prices.  Shadow prices indicate the amount by which the objective  function would
be reduced  if an additional  unit  of a milk component  is made  available.  Two  types of
shadow prices are generated by the model-a supply shadow price and a processing  shadow
price.  The supply shadow price corresponded to raw milk at the farm with a fixed ratio of
butterfat to skim nonfat  (SNF).  Although  the ratio  is fixed  within each  region, the  ratio
varied  from  one  region to the  next.  In contrast,  the processing  shadow  price, reflecting
values  at the plant is comprised  of two prices,  one  for butterfat  and one for skim non-fat
(SNF).  Thus, for a particular product in a region, the shadow price for butterfat may increase
while the shadow price for SNF may have decreased under trade liberalizing policies.
If a shadow price increased from one simulation to another, then the relative incentive
to market milk increased  and vice versa. Thus, the magnitude  or the direction of a shadow
price change is not relevant.  Only the magnitude of a shadow price relative to those of other
regions  for the same  product  have relevance  in  assessing the  impacts  of different  trade
policies.
Trade Flow Maps.  Trade flow maps are useful for finding cross-border movements and can
be used to  illustrate  differences  in trade flows between  simulations.  Triangles  represent
processing plants, and lines from the triangles represent product movements  from plants to
consumption  points.  The  lines  that represent  flows  are  not  proportional  to  quantities.
Therefore,  an insignificant  flow  and a  large  flow of a particular  dairy  product would  be
represented by  lines with identical appearance.
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Raw Milk Movements.  Because fewer raw milk movements exist relative to finished product
movements and because their variability  across simulations is not significant,  raw milk flows
will be discussed only briefly.  Milk destined for fluid milk plants travelled moderate to long
distances, but few milk supplies used in the production of dry and condensed milk are located
far  from  the  processing  plants.  Furthermore,  butter  plants  had  such  short  raw  milk
movements associated  with them that no supply to processing movements are discerable.
The  explanation  is  found  in  the  costs  associated  with  transportation,  i.e.  the higher  the
product's distribution cost, the  closer the processing plants are to the consumption  points.
The number of plants  is also dependent  on transportation costs.  If a product  is relatively
inexpensive  to transport,  it is more efficient to have  a few  large plants located near supply
points than many smaller plants located near consumption points.
Processing to Demand Movements.  In the base simulation, Quebec shipped butter, cheddar
cheese and dry  and condensed  milk to Ontario  and the CAED.  Results  are illustrated  for
cheddar cheese  in Map  1.
Map 1.  Cheddar Cheese:  Processing  to Demand  Movements
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Quebec also shipped  specialty cheese to the CAED, and imported  yogurt and frozen
dessert from Ontario.  Ontario shipped frozen dessert and yogurt to the CAED and Quebec,
and  exported  cheddar  and  specialty  cheese  to the CAED.  Specialty  cheese  results  are
illustrated in Map 2.
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Map 2.  Specialty  Cheese:  Processing to Demand  Movements
New York imported butter from Vermont,  Pennsylvania, and Maryland  in the base
simulation.  However,  New  York  exported  frozen  dessert  and  yogurt to  Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Vermont, and imported frozen dessert from Vermont as well.  New York also
exported  cheddar  cheese,  dry  and  condensed  milk,  and  specialty  cheese  to  SNE.
Pennsylvania exported butter to Maryland, New York,  and New Jersey,  while it imported
yogurt from New York.  Pennsylvania exported yogurt to the US aggregated excess demand
(USED),  Maryland,  District of Columbia, Delaware,  and New Jersey.  Pennsylvania also
exported cheddar cheese,  dry and condensed milk and specialty cheese to New York City,
SNE and MAT.  Vermont exported butter and frozen dessert to New York, and frozen dessert
to Maine.  Vermont also exported cheddar cheese, specialty cheese and dry and condensed
milk to New York,  SNE,  and the other NNE regions.  The USES exported cheddar  cheese
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to Western New  York, Pennsylvania and SNE, while it exported  dry and condensed milk to
New York, Pennsylvania,  SNE, and MAT.
Map 3 shows that fluid milk is a local business with short movements from plants to
the consumers.  The map also reveals that the optimal market structure consists of numerous
plants, with plant density highest near large metropolitan areas.  In contrast, butter plants are
less numerous  and have longer processing to consumer movements.  The market structure
of butter processing plants is nearly opposite that of fluid milk plants, and the results imply
that there exists an economic  incentive for butter plants  to locate near supply points.
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Map 3.  Fluid Milk: Processing  to Demand  Movements
In general,  lower transportation  costs fort  an  produt  fewr  plants  to process that
product and longer movements of that product from processing to demand . For example,
fluid  milk  is  rather  expensive  to  transport,  but  dry  and  condensed  milk  are  relatively
inexpensive  to ship.  The base simulation resulted  in  121  plants processing  fluid milk  but
only  9 plants processing  dry and condensed milk.
The  plant  density  shown  in  the  preceding  maps  may  be  misleading  because
differences  in plant size are not addressed.  The size of  processing plants differs significantly
across regions in the base.  For example, New York and SNE fluid plants are twice as big as
those in the other regions.  For yogurt, the plants with  the highest average  size are found in
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Quebec,  Ontario  and Pennsylvania,  while the smallest plants  are in NNE and New York.
New York and MAT ice cream plants are twice the size of the Quebec and Ontario ice cream
plants.  Regarding  cheddar and  specialty cheese plants, Pennsylvania and New York have
the largest plants.  On  average the largest dry  and condensed  milk plants are  in Quebec,
Ontario and NNE, while the largest butter plants are in Ontario, Pennsylvania and  SNE.
A summary  of the net interregional  trade  flows  for all products  combined  can be
observed  in Map 4.
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Map 4.  Net Interregional Trade Flows:  All  Dairy Products in Million of Kilograms of
Products
Map 5 presents the supply shadow prices for the base simulation.  The supply shadow
prices increased from the northwest to the southeast in the Northeast United States, from east
to west in Quebec,  and from west to east in Ontario.  In general,  supply shadow prices are
higher in Canada than they are in the Northeast United States.
A  fluid milk  shadow  price  is  calculated  using the  butterfat  and  SNF processing
shadow price generated  by the model.  Fluid milk is chosen  for the processing shadow price
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contour maps,  because  it is the  most  consistent  product across  regions  and  is present  in
significant quantities in all regions.  Map 6 presents the processing ( fluid milk) shadow price
for the base simulation.  In the Canadian  regions, shadow prices increased from east to west,
while in Northeast United States they increased from northwest to southeast.  Processing
shadow prices are  much higher  in Canada  than in  the United  States regions,  the  highest
values occurring  in Northeastern Ontario.
Map  5.  Supply Shadow  Prices: Canadian Dollars per Hectoliter
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Map 6.  Processing  Shadow Prices:  Canadian Dollars per Hectoliter
Free Trade Simulation
Raw Milk Movements.  In the Free Trade simulation,  all dairy products and raw milk could
move freely between the Canadian and U.S. regions.  The results indicate that no movements
of fluid milk between the United States and Canada occurred  in the Free Trade simulation.
This result is a consequence of the transportation cost structure  of fluid milk and raw milk.
Raw milk is less expensive to transport than fluid milk.  Thus,  it is not surprising to observe
cross-border movements of raw milk to fluid milk plants but no cross-border movements of
fluid milk.
Based on relative  marketing  costs, some cross-border movements  of raw milk are
evident in the Free Trade  simulation.  Raw  milk moved from New  York to Ontario  and
Quebec  fluid milk plants,  and raw  milk from  Quebec  went to Vermont  specialty  cheese
plants.  Although a limited amount  of raw milk moved  from Canada to the U.S.  and vice
versa,  in the short run more U.S.  milk would be pulled North due to lower U.S.  raw milk
price.  Factor price  equalization would put that down toward the levels suggested by the
model in the longer run.
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Quebec  increased net exports  of raw milk for cheddar  and specialty cheeses and  for
ice cream  by 7,  13,  and 7 points, respectively.  At the same time, Quebec increased  its net
imports  of raw milk for fluid  milk processing  by  8 percentage  points.  Similarly,  Ontario
increased its net raw milk imports  for fluid milk, ice cream and cheddar cheese by 34, 7, and
3 percentage points, respectively.  New York shifted from being a net importer of raw milk
for  fluid  processing  in  the  base  simulation  to  being  a  net  exporter  in  the  Free  Trade
simulation.
The decrease in net  imports of raw milk for dry and  condensed milk of 2,650 points
in NNE resulted from the combined effect of eliminating raw milk imports from New York
and diverting local supply to a dry and condensed milk plant.
Processing to Demand.  The number of plants that received raw milk for a particular product
as shown in supply to processing movements maps does not necessarily  correspond to the
number of plants that effectively  processed that product,  shown in processing  to demand
movements maps.  This  apparent discrepancy  resulted  from interplant movements.  Some
plants received raw milk and redirected butterfat and SNF to other plants without performing
any processing activities.
Under the conditions imposed by the Free Trade simulation,  Quebec lost market share
for all dairy products  except cheddar cheese and ice cream.  Quebec significantly increased
its net  exports  of cheddar  and  shifted  from  a net importer  of ice  cream to a  net exporter
(Table  1).  Small  losses for fluid  milk and  specialty cheese are also predicted.  The loss of
the CAED butter market and part of the Ontario  butter market to USES resulted in a 33 point
decrease  in Quebec's net butter exports.  The  effect of the  lost market share  is somewhat
mitigated by Quebec's butter exports to Maine,  Vermont, and New York.
Predicted exports of dry and condensed milk to Maine did not compensate for the loss
of the CAED and Ontario dry and condensed  markets to USES.  Moreover, Ontario,  and to
a  lesser  extent  USES,  penetrated  part of Quebec's  domestic  market  for nonfat  dry  and
condensed milk.  As a result, Quebec is expected to lose 4 dry and condensed milk plants and
shift from being a net exporter to being a net importer of dry and condensed  milk.  Quebec
also shifted  from being a net exporter to being a net importer of yogurt.  This is partially due
to new exports  to Maine and  Northern  New York.  Quebec  became  a net exporter of ice
cream and exported  to Vermont  and New York.  Quebec  significantly increased exports of
cheddar cheese under the Free Trade simulation trade conditions.
A comparison of Maps  1 and 2 with Maps  7  and 8 shows new trade  dynamics  for
cheese.  Traditional East to West movements  in Canada are replaced by North to South
movements.  Quebec  lost its CAED and Ontario cheese market to USES  and New York, but
exports  to New England more than  compensated  for the  lost market.  However,  Quebec's
farm and plant values  for milk  components declined  greatly  in the Free Trade simulation
(Maps  5, 6,  9, and  10).
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Free  Trade  Scenario
Cheddar  Cheese-Processing  to  Demand  Movements
Map 7.  Cheddar Cheese:  Processing  to Demand Movements
Map 8.  Specialty Cheese:  Processing  to Demand Movements
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Ontario  increased its net exports  for all  dairy products  except yogurt and  specialty
cheese.  Net imports of specialty cheese slightly increased.  Ontario shifted from being a net
exporter of yogurt to being a net importer,  and from being a net importer of cheddar cheese
to being a net exporter.  Ontario's loss of  the CAED cheddar cheese market to USES  is more
than compensated by cheddar cheese exports to New York.  Ontario also reduced net imports
of butter  and  dry  and  condensed  milk  by  17  points  and  117  points,  respectively.  The
reduction  in dry and condensed  milk net imports  is explained by  new exports to  Quebec,
New York and SNE.  As a result, the Western Ontario dry and condensed plant is replaced
by a larger plant in Eastern Ontario.  Significant  decreases  in the value of Ontario farm milk
and plant milk components  also occurred in the Free Trade simulation.  Maps 9 and  10 and
Table 1 illustrated the implications  for calculated  milk values.
Map 9.  Supply Shadow Prices: Canadian Dollars per Hectoliter
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Map 10.  Processing  Shadow  Prices: Canadian Dollars per Hectoliter
Table 1.  Changes  in Shadow  Prices  for  Supply, Butterfat  and  SNF for Various
Dairy Products Relative to the Base Scenario, Free Trade Simulation.
SNE  NNE  NY  ON
Supply  Fat  SNF  Supply  Fat  SNF  Supply  Fat  SNF  Supply  Fat  SNF
Fluid  25%  36%  -6%  31%  32%  -18%  37%  40%  -6%  -73%  -57%  -24%
Butter  0%  64%  -10%  0%  0%  0%  0%  68%  -32%  0%  -51%  -95%
Ice  cream  0%  33%  -1%  45%  28%  -12%  47%  41%  -2%  -82%  -55%  -18%
Yogurt  46%  13%  -6%  15%  -5%  -8%  28%  -10%  -18%  -87%  -58%  -47%
Cheddar  cheese  0%  0%  0%  25%  0%  0%  51%  31%  1%  -78%  -43%  -66%
Specialty  cheese  0%  0%  0%  28%  2%  -16%  48%  22%  -3%  -80%  -48%  -66%
Dry &  Condensed  0%  0%  0%  25%  41%  -28%  30%  0%  0%  -85%  -56%  -48%
PA  QC  MAT
Supply  Fat  SNF  Supply  Fat  SNF  Supply  Fat  SNF
Fluid  39%  36%  -5%  -74%  -51%  0%  36%  37%  -6%
Butter  0%  72%  -19%  0%  -46%  -99%  0%  71%  -10%
Ice  cream  48%  39%  -7%  -78%  -49%  63%  42%  44%  -7%
Yogurt  57%  20%  -3%  -79%  -54%  -2%  0%  0%  0%
Cheddar  cheese  34%  25%  -1%  -70%  -41%'-23%  0%  0%  0%
Specialty  cheese  46%  20%  -3%  -77%  -52%  -32%  0%  0%  0%
Dry &  Condensed  56%  41%  -7%  -75%  -51%  -28%  0%  0%  0%
j_7  z  ~  ~  -5  m-E4  74__9___
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For New York, imports of yogurt and nonfat dry and  condensed milk decreased  by
50  and  343  percentage  points,  respectively.  Cheddar  cheese  exports  decreased  by  2
percentage points, and  specialty cheese exports are reduced by  8 percentage  points.  In the
Free Trade simulation New York lost its only dry and condensed plant.  However,  values of
plant milk components and farm  milk values improved greatly relative to the base.
By decreasing net imports of butter and increasing net exports of specialty cheese and
dry and condensed  milk, NNE gained exports in hard products.  The gain in butter resulted
from exports to Quebec.  Exports  of specialty cheese  and dry and  condensed milk to New
York and SNE accounted for the export gains.  However, NNE significantly increased its net
imports of yogurt, and shifted from being a net exporter of ice cream and  cheddar cheese to
being a net importer  of these  two products.  Although NNE  farm  milk values  and  plant
component  values  did  not  increase  as  much  as  those  in  other  Northeast  states,  they
nonetheless increased significantly.
The trading patterns of the other regions is relatively  unaffected.  All Northeast U.S.
supply and processing shadow prices  increased  in the Free Trade simulation.  International
flows are summarized  in Map  11.  For each of the Canadian and U.S. regions,  butter supply
shadow prices  are zero (Table  1).  This is explained by a non-binding supply of raw milk for
butter,  and the placement of butter plants at supply point locations.
Free Trade  Simulation-Net  Interregional  Trade  Flows
All Products
Map 11.  Net  Interregional  Trade  Flows:  All  Dairy  Products  in  Million  of
Kilograms of Products
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Summary of U.S.-Canada  Free Trade
Although free trade may place downward pressure on prices, it has the advantage of
opening alternative markets over time for both countries.  It also would result in significant
gains in transportation efficiency.  Free trade creates possibilities for growth and spreads the
negative  price  effects  for  Canadians  across  the  industry,  instead  of concentrating  the
hardships  in a few sectors,  as would be the case with liberalizing  trade on a product sub-
sector by sub-sector basis as some have proposed.
Physical trade in New York and NNE are impacted  somewhat by free trade; the trade
levels of the other Northeast U.S. regions  are not notably  affected.  The USES gained the
majority of new exports to Canada in the Free Trade simulation.  Most of the USES exports
are, however, directed to the CAED point.  That is, the western US tends to serve western
Canada.  Nevertheless,  all regions in the Northeast United States,  especially New York and
Pennsylvania, registered a significant increase in shadow prices in the Free Trade simulation.
One  interesting  finding is that fluid milk processing and distribution are minimally
affected  by  either trade  scenario.  It  appears  that marketing  costs  alone  are  enough  to
essentially insulate fluid milk from free trade.  The Dairy Farmers of Canada have estimated
that approximately  3 percent  of the  Canadian  fluid  milk consumption  in  1991  could  be
attributed to U.S. cross-border shipments.  This occurs now because fluid milk supply  and
demand are equilibrated independently  in the two countries.  Since that time, this estimate
has been lowered due to a weaker Canadian  dollar.  From the model results and cross-border
purchase  estimates,  3  percent  to  5  percent  is  probably  the  upper  limit  on  Canadian
importation  of fluid milk.  This bound should remain  effective  despite  variations  in the
exchange  rate.  Therefore,  a Canadian  trade policy negotiator would be  advised to  drop
significantly the tariff level on fluid milk in exchange  for concessions on the level of tariff
placed on other dairy products.
Another implication of the study is that the Canadian regions consistently do well with
regards to cheese when trade is allowed between United States and Canada.  Quebec cheese
processors  have a competitive advantage  which enables them to ship cheddar and specialty
cheese to New England.  Ontario cheese processors  also have  a competitive advantage  and
ship cheese to New York.  These competitive advantages  are robust and resistant to changes
in marketing costs.  On the other hand, the USES has a clear competitive advantage  for the
delivery of cheese in Western Canada.  In spite of the  loss of the Canadian market, Quebec
and Ontario more than compensate with cheese exports to the Northeast United States.
The Canadian competitive advantage for cheddar and specialty cheese should not be
underestimated  or ignored  by  Canadian  policy  negotiators.  The results  suggest that the
current tariff level of more than 300 percent is not necessary to protect the Canadian  cheese
industry.  Papillon  (1995)  found that a tariff level of 30 percent to 40 percent would be as
effective  as a 300 percent tariff level.  Thus,  it would be to Canada's advantage  to lower
Canadian tariffs on cheese  in exchange  for greater access to U.S. markets.
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The results  suggest that geographic proximity  is an  important factor  in determining
trade impact on regions.  Thus,  Pennsylvania and the MAT states are not active players  in
the model, while New York and NNE are the most active players.  Similarly,  the USES and
the  CAED points,  which are  relatively  close to  each  other, have  a significant  amount  of
interaction.
Through shadow prices, the model confirmed that any degree of trade liberalization
will change the intrinsic value of raw milk, especially in Canada.  Although the price effects
on raw milk were not directly estimated, the supply shadow prices, which represent the value
of an extra unit of raw milk at a supply point, still allow one to make conclusions.  Using the
average  net milk price at the farm for Quebec  and New York in May  1995  and the  changes
in supply  shadow price from the base  simulation to the two trade scenarios,  a price effect
could be estimated.  In Quebec, dairy farmers received  an average of $51.00 per hectoliter
in May 1995.  That  amount is reduced to $39.00 per hectoliter with the implementation  of
free trade conditions.  New York dairy farmers received an average of $40.50 (Canadian) per
hectoliter in May 1995.  Under free trade conditions, the average price  in New York for raw
milk at the farm rose to $46.00 per hectoliter.  These price effects should be seen as the first
step in  a price  adjustment process  following  a shock  to  the  market  structure.  The  final
equilibrium should imply a smaller price decrease  for Quebec,  and a smaller price increase
for New York.
The model also suggested  that consumers will be affected  by trade liberalization  in
the dairy sector through consumer price variations.  A look  at the processing  shadow price
provides  some instruction  as to how the  simulation might affect consumer prices of dairy
products.  Thus, Canadian consumers  should experience  significant price decreases  under
free trade.  In contrast, Northeast U.S.  consumers should realize price increases  in the Free
Trade simulation.
THE  IMPLICATIONS  OF  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  WITH  U.S.  FEDERAL
MILK MARKETING  ORDERS
Background
For almost sixty years, Federal Milk Marketing Orders  (FMMOs) have regulated the
terms and conditions under which grade A milk is purchased from U.S. farmers.  At the heart
of the program is a complementary system of classified pricing, which values milk according
to  its  end  use,  and  the  pooling  of revenues  arising  from  the  sale  of milk products.  An
immediate  problem  raised  by  the  spectre  of trade  liberalization  concerns  the  ability  of
FMMOs to maintain the integrity and performance  of classified pricing and pooling when
barriers to trade are either removed or relaxed.  Federal regulation replaced state regulation
in the early days of marketing orders because the prevalence  of interstate commerce  in milk
rendered  state authority  ineffective.  At issue now is whether international  commerce will
222Novakovic, Doyon and Bishop
similarly  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  federal  orders.  Marketing  orders  regulate  milk
processors, not farmers  nor processor's customers,  and do so through the use of minimum
price regulation.  Because  it is fluid handlers who are required to pay a higher price, it is they
for whom trade liberalization provides an incentive to avoid regulation.  For example,  it is
easy to imagine a fluid milk processor  located just across the U.S. border processing  milk
purchased  either locally or from nearby U.S.  farmers,  and then selling class I products  in
regulated U.S.  markets.  Such  a handler, by virtue of being located  in another country and
regardless of whether it is U.S.  or foreign owned, would avoid the class I pool obligations
to the order in which it makes its sales.  Quite simply, the potential to profitably engage in
this type of arbitrage, within the scope of any particular order, depends on the extent to which
the increased milk assembly and distribution costs are outweighed by the difference between
the class I price and the prevailing blend price.
This study  is restricted  to factors directly impacting the  integrity or performance  of
FMMOs as an agent for achieving economic performance  objectives in the U.S. dairy sector.
The implications of freer trade  for price levels, export opportunities,  or other factors that are
of importance to the dairy sector but which do not have particular and direct implications  for
FMMOs  are not addressed.  Although this study is primarily concerned with federal  milk
marketing orders,  the impact of trade liberalization on similar state marketing programs  is
also analysed.
The Base Solution
In  order  to perform  any  analysis  of a  new policy  or  market  environment,  it  is
necessary to first establish a base from which to make comparisons.  This section describes
the base solution used for such comparisons in this study.  The base solution is designed to
simulate the economic  activity and policy settings  in the U.S. dairy sector, particularly  as it
relates  to marketing orders.  Therefore,  some imports, primarily of cheese,  occurs subject to
quotas; some exporting, particularly NDM to Mexico, takes place; and grade A milk is priced
under federal or state regulations.
An overall impression of the base solution can be gained from viewing the thematic
maps  in Maps  12 and  13.  These maps represent, respectively,  the flows of raw milk from
farms,  or supply points, to fluid milk processing plants, and flows of fluid milk from plants
to  demand  areas.  The  solid  triangles  represent  plants  and  their  size  gives  a  relative
indication of the level of activity.  Thus, in Map  12, the triangles denote the destination end
of the flows which  are depicted by the lines, while in Map  13, the triangles denote the origin
of the flows.  A triangle without a line radiating from it implies that the supply or demand
activity is located in the same area as the processing  activity.  These conventions will apply
to all subsequent thematic  maps presented throughout this report.
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Map  13.  Fluid Milk Distribution  Flows from Processing Plants  to Consumption
Areas, Base Solution
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Immediately  noticeable  from these maps  is  that fluid  processing plants tend  to be
located near the demand areas  and further  away from the raw milk supply areas.  Indeed, the
simple average length of raw milk shipments to fluid plants, originating in the United States,
is  76.3 miles  while  for packaged  milk  distribution movements  terminating  in the  United
States it is  25.3 miles.  This phenomenon  is consistent with both economic  theory and other
studies (Bressler,  1958; Francis,  1992),  and general  observation.  There  are  190 U.S. fluid
plants receiving  a total of  almost 60.2 billion pounds of farm milk in the base solution.  55.9
billion pounds of packaged milk are distributed  from these plants to U.S.  demand areas.  In
addition, these fluid plants also shipped out significant quantities of cream for use by other
types of plants.
Based upon actual North American interregional  trade, the only permissible  base case
cross-border  movements are between the United States and Mexico.  While the model  found
an optimal solution without making any flows from the United States to Mexico of either raw
milk or packaged  milk, there are U.S. shipments of manufactured products  to Mexico  in the
base solution.
Although this model has been constructed  with structural  simplicity  in mind, there
remains ample opportunity for misspecification that can lead to results which do not conform
to expectations.  The base solution, however,  is entirely  consistent with expectations.  Based
on the model's output, we estimate there to be  about  140 billion pounds  of regulated  grade
A milk received at plants; roughly  113 by federal orders  and about 27 under state programs.
Adding  to this another billion or so pounds of unregulated  grade A sales,  approximately  2
billion pounds of direct sales by suppliers,  and about 6 or 7 billion pounds of grade B milk,
yields the  149.1  billion pounds of milk actually marketed  in 1993.
Trade Liberalization Without Regulation of Foreign Plants
This simulation examines  the impact on FMMOs when trade policies are liberalized
and  fluid  milk  processors  located  outside  the  United  States  are  not  legally  able  to  be
regulated  under  the terms  and  provisions  of federal  orders.  This  is not  to  say  that  the
products  such processors might ship to the United States do not have to meet the necessary
sanitary and phytosanitary  standards  or conform to the  identity standards  of the particular
product being shipped.  It simply assumes that the administrators  of federal  orders have no
jurisdiction to require plants located outside of the United States to abide by the rules of the
order  in the marketing area to which they plan to sell class I products.  In particular,  such
plants  do not have to pay producers  the blend price, nor do they  have to  contribute  to the
order's producer settlement  fund.  To the extent that class  I differentials more than cover the
extra  cost of transporting  raw milk  and/or  final  fluid milk  additional  distances,  plants  in
Canada and Mexico will thus have an incentive to ship fluid milk to the United States,  using
as an input either local raw milk or raw milk procured in the United  States.
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The  degree  of trade  liberalization  included  in  this  particular  scenario  is  quite
extensive.  In  fact,  complete  free  trade  among  the  NAFTA  countries  in  raw  milk,
intermediate products, and final products,  both fluid and  manufactured,  is permitted.  The
quantity of imports able to enter any of the NAFTA countries from the rest of the world is
left at the base case levels.  It has already been argued that such trade would not involve fluid
products and would therefore have no bearing on the performance  of FMMOs.  The supply
of raw  milk displaced  by increased  imports  of manufactured  products  would, over time,
diminish or continue to be utilized as a class III use.  Either way, while there could well be
competitive implications for the U.S.  dairy sector, they are unrelated to the operation and
performance of FMMOs  so are of no concern to this study.  The blend price in any particular
order might well decrease as a result of increased imports of manufactured products  but this
does not in and of itself imply  a problem with the functioning of federal orders.
Before proceeding,  it is helpful to briefly review some of the underlying factors upon
which this and subsequent solutions  are predicated.  First, the focus of the analysis is on the
potential  first round  impacts  and  what they  suggest  about the  incentive  to  circumvent
marketing orders' regulations under liberalized trade.  Indeed, because the model features no
price response  on either the supply or the demand  side so it would be incorrect to interpret
the  results  as being  the  long  run  equilibrium  outcome.  If the  consequences  of trade
liberalization  for  marketing orders  are severe,  one  would logically  expect some kind of
policy response  to mitigate these  affects.  Secondly,  although  free  trade with  Canada  is
assumed, this of course  is not the current policy.  Nor is there any agreement as yet to even
begin phasing in such a policy.  However,  many analysts believe that it is just a matter of
time before  dairy  trade with Canada  dramatically  increases  so  analysing this  scenario  is
beneficial.  Along the Mexican  border,  the restrictions  on  dairy  trade are  already  being
relaxed  under  the  terms  of the  NAFTA  agreement,  and  will  continue  to  do  so  at  an
accelerating pace.  Finally, all uses of milk other than class I are assumed to be priced at the
class III price.  The implications of such an approximation are minimal because such prices
are similar to class III prices anyway and the quantity of milk they utilize is relatively small.
Because for much of the North American region the outcome of this simulation looks
much like the base case, there  is little to be gained by  viewing maps of the entire region.
Rather, Maps  14 and 15 contrast the present trade liberalization scenario with the base case
for those areas where substantial differences  exist.  Specifically, these figures compare raw
milk  assembly  and fluid milk distribution  movements  in the vicinity of the northern U.S.
border east of Michigan and along the border with Mexico. The former is our focus for this
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Map  14.  Raw Milk Flows from Supply Points to Fluid Milk Processing Plants in
the Northeast, Base and Trade Liberalization  Solutions
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Map 15.  Fluid Milk Distribution  Flows from Processing Plants to Consumption
Areas in the Northeast, Base and Trade Liberalization  Solutions
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Consistent  with  expectations,  class  I differentials  provide  a  substantial  arbitrage
opportunity, the exploitation of which requires that both raw and packaged  milk be hauled
longer distances.  An indication of  this is the average distance that raw milk from U.S. supply
points must be hauled which increases by 3 miles over the base case.  More significant is the
increase of almost  14 miles to 39.2 for the average distance that packaged milk destined for
U.S.  markets must be transported.  This suggests  two things; first, supplies of U.S. farm milk
are  being shipped across the border only if they are located close to the border,  and second,
Canada and  Mexico  are diverting significant  quantities  of their own  raw milk supplies  to
fluid plants  for use in the production of packaged milk destined for U.S. markets.  Moreover,
these shipments of packaged milk are moving a considerable  distance into the interior of the
United States.  There are  169 plants processing fluid milk in the United  States, down  from
190 in the base solution.
Interestingly  there  are  no  cross-border  movements  aimed  at circumventing  price
regulation taking place in the Northwest.  Several explanations  can be offered for this.  First,
the  fat-adjusted  class  I  differential  in  the  Pacific  Northwest  order  at  $1.25/cwt.  is
considerably  lower  than  in the  marketing  areas  located  in  the Northeast and  Southwest.
Hence, there is an insufficient incentive created by the class I differential to warrant shipping
raw milk from the United States to Canadian fluid plants and back again as packaged milk.
Second, the western part of Canada is a milk deficient  area so there is simply no Canadian
milk available for the production of packaged  milk for U.S. markets.  Moreover,  the supplies
of raw  milk  that  do  exist  are  a  considerable  distance  from  the  major  northwestern  US
markets.  Finally,  class I utilization  in the  Pacific Northwest order,  at around 32 percent,
together with the relatively low class I differential would imply  a lower blend price than in
areas such  as the Northeast or Southwest.  Thus, the  incentive to avoid regulation under the
order would necessarily  be lower.
Class I Credit
The final of the three principal simulations  is referred  to as the class I credit scenario.
The motivation  for this experiment stems from the concerns of regulators in markets near the
Mexican border who,  already,  are proposing  policy  responses to the  difficulties  faced by
marketing orders when trade is liberalized.  In a nutshell, this simulation  allows fluid plants
in a predefined zone  along the border to procure milk at less than the class I price.  In fact,
such plants  would  be  able  to  purchase  farm  milk  at  the blend price and thereby  remain
competitive with unregulated plants  located across the border.  The mechanism  by which a
scheme such as this allows  eligible plants to purchase  grade A milk for class I use at less than
the class I price would  be to award  a monthly credit equal to  the difference  between that
month's class I and blend prices.  The  benefit is that the processing activity remains based
in the United States and the portion of the revenue  over and above the basic  formula price
is pooled, but the cost manifests itself as a lower price for producers.  There  is clearly some
flexibility available in defining the class I credit zone.  While a more inclusive zone is better
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able  to prevent  arbitraging  of the  class I differentials,  this must  be weighed  against the
resulting diminution of the blend price.
It is  envisioned  by  advocates  of this type of arrangement that the zone  of plants
eligible  to receive  the class  I credit would be  defined  geographically.  For example,  all
counties  contiguous  to the  border,  or  a  50  mile  wide  district  along  the  border,  would
encompass  all eligible plants.  While the model used in this study is very disaggregated,  it
does not include every single plant location in the country.  Thus, the class I credit simulation
is implemented as follows.  First, all marketing areas receiving shipments of class I products
from outside the United States under the previous free trade simulation are identified.  They
are then assigned a class I differential  of zero and the  free trade simulation  is run again.  In
other words, any U.S. fluid plant can serve those markets and can procure the necessary raw
milk to do so on an equal footing with foreign plants.  The consumption area represented in
the model by the city of Portland, ME is also assigned a zero class I differential even though
that market was not served by Canadian-based processors  in the free trade case.
As expected, the solution to this scenario looks much like the base case as  far as the
class I sector is concerned.  In the north, only one shipment of raw  milk from the United
States  to  a fluid plant  in  Canada occurred;  from Newport  VT to Sherbrooke  in Quebec.
However, unlike in the free trade case,  no shipments of packaged milk came into the United
States  from Canada.  Along the Mexican  border,  there are  small  volumes  of raw  milk
crossing the border in both directions, destined  for plants of all types, while a small amount
of packaged fluid milk is shipped from Mexico to the United States.  All of these shipments
are  between  points  close  to  the  border.  Maps  15  and  16  illustrate  the  assembly  and
distribution pattern under this scenario  in the same way as was presented for the free trade
case.
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Map 16.  Raw Milk Flows from Supply Points to Fluid Milk Processing Plants in
the Northeast, Base and Class I Credit Solutions
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Once  again, the  average distance  that raw milk  is assembled  and packaged  milk is
distributed  conforms with both expectations and  theory when compared  with the previous
two simulations.  Removing trade barriers and precluding the hauling of milk long distances
solely  to  avoid class  I differentials  has the  aggregate  effect  of allowing  fluid processing
plants to be  located even closer to the markets they serve.  Compared with the base case, the
average  distance that packaged  milk is  transported to U.S. markets  falls slightly from 25.3
to 24.9 miles.  Concomitant  with this the average  distance that U.S.  farm milk gets hauled
to fluid plants increases  from 76.3 to 78.3 miles.  Note that in the case of both assembly  and
distribution,  these  distances  are  less  than  for  the  previous  free  trade  scenario where  the
incentive to avoid class I differentials existed.
Summary of Results
While the impression gained from the thematic maps is perhaps  one of some change
but  nothing too  drastic,  this particular  scenario causes  a significant  reallocation  of milk
among plant types, and across countries.  In general,  the United States ships less milk to fluid
plants and more to manufacturing plants while in Canada and Mexico the reverse  is true.  In
fact, the United States ships  an incredible  17.8 percent less milk to its own fluid plants.  This
magnitude of change  is surely  significant and,  moreover,  as will be seen  shortly, it is felt
entirely in the Northeast  and Southwest.  There  is no doubt that the reduction in the class I
utilization that this implies for the affected orders  will result in much lower blend prices  for
producers  in those areas.
The raw  milk diverted  away  from U.S.  fluid plants  is either sent to fluid plants  in
Canada and Mexico; or it gets shipped to manufacturing plants in either the United  States,
Canada, or Mexico.  Fluid plants in Canada and Mexico  draw in additional  supplies of raw
milk not only from the United States but from  local areas as well.  In fact, Canada increases
deliveries of its own raw milk to fluid plants by a staggering 42.8 percent while Mexico does
the same to the tune of 7.7 percent.  The proportion of milk diverted  from fluid plants  in the
United States to fluid plants in Canada equates to almost 3 percent of the quantity assembled
at U.S.  fluid plants  in the base  solution while  for the  Mexico,  the same  proportion  is  8.2
percent.  Finally, taking total deliveries to both fluid  and manufacturing plants together,  the
United States  suffers  an  overall loss  of almost  5.2  percent  in the  level of activity  at the
processing sector.  Of course,  under such a scenario  as this, those new or expanded plants in
Mexico  and Canada might well be  U.S. owned but that would  be of little comfort to  U.S.
producers  receiving a much lower price for their milk.
The distribution side of  the ledger is consistent with what has just been described with
respect to raw milk assembly.  Notably,  fluid plants in the United States distribute  18  percent
less packaged milk with the shortfall being made up of shipments arriving from Canada and
Mexico.  Canada now supplies 8.3  percent of U.S.  fluid needs while Mexico  supplies over
9.6 percent.  Of the packaged milk that Canada now ships to the United States,  a much lower
proportion  is  produced  from raw milk procured  in the  United  States than  is the case  for
Mexico.  In fact,  on a strictly volume basis, raw milk procured  from the United States is  91.6
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percent of the packaged milk that Mexico distributed to the United States whereas the same
proportion  in the case of Canada is only 38.5 percent.  This disparity has implications for the
way U.S. producer  prices will be impacted  and these will be discussed shortly.
The  total  cost  of transporting  milk  and  milk  products  after  trade  is  liberalized
increases by  over  16 percent with only  a modest increase in raw milk assembly costs but a
staggering 220 percent increase in the cost of distributing packaged milk.  These changes are
consistent  with the earlier  finding of trade  liberalization  leading  to milk being hauled  a
similar distance when assembled at plants but much  further when distributed.  It is apparent
that the ability of foreign plants to avoid the higher class I price when procuring milk means
that they have an incentive to both procure U.S. milk if it's near the border, and distribute  to
U.S. markets that are a considerable distance  from the border.
The cost  of assembling  milk  at manufacturing  plants  increases  noticeably.  This
follows from foreign fluid plants, especially in Canada, drawing in much more local milk and
thus  depriving nearby manufacturing  plants of their supplies.  Consequently, those plants
have to seek milk from further away, including from the United States.
Turning now to the specific orders impacted by trade liberalization, there are  11  such
orders and the degree of impact is quite severe. These  orders are those that border Mexico.
The orders that border Quebec and Ontario and the Ohio Valley Order, which is close enough
to Windsor, Ontario to be affected,  even though  it does not strictly border Ontario.  Three of
these are state rather than federal milk marketing orders.  Although operating under different
legal authority, the implication  for state orders is no different from that for federal orders.
In the  case of Western New York and Southern California, the fluid processing  industry is
totally displaced.  The State of California operates a statewide pool so the implication for the
blend price will be muted somewhat.  Nevertheless,  these results portend significant price
declines.
While  three  of these  areas  are  not  encompassed  by  federal  orders,  there  exists
something identical or akin to a class I differential  in all cases.  With lower quantities of class
I milk being pooled in these areas under liberalized trade, the blend price will surely decline.
However,  competitive  pressure  for  the  supply of milk  in the area  may result  in class III
processors  having  to  offer a  higher price  than they  otherwise  would  simply  to  elicit an
adequate supply so it is not really clear just how low the producer price would go.  Even the
least affected order,  Ohio Valley with a 14.3  percent reduction  in fluid milk distributed from
U.S.  plants,  is materially  impacted.  With  an actual class I utilization currently around  57
percent, this scenario  would see that drop to 49.1  percent and at current prices, the result
would be a  17 cents/cwt. reduction of the blend price.  This amount would be sufficient to
stress some producers.
An obvious question that follows from this outcome  concerns the nature of the  flow-
on effect, if any, that occurs  in nearby  orders.  Surprisingly,  the  answer appears to be that
there is no such effect.  For all affected orders, the nearby areas maintain the same pattern
of assembly movements to fluid plants and distribution movements from those plants.  All
of the adjustment following trade liberalization  appears to manifest itself through either the
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relocation  of fluid  processing,  or through changes  in the  manufacturing  sector at both the
assembly and  distribution levels.  A further part of the explanation  as to why the impact is
limited to the border areas may have to do with the regional  variation in the composition of
raw milk.  The problem  of assembling milk at plants, processing it into final products, and
distributing  those  products  to  demand  areas  is  constrained  not  only  by  the  cost  of
transportation  but also by the availability of milk components in a given area.  It simply may
not be  economical to substitute one supply area for another only slightly further  away if the
composition  of the milk is such that a greater volume of milk must be acquired, and thus a
higher cost incurred, just to obtain the same quantity of components.
Another question of interest in the face of trade liberalization  relates to how the price
surface  changes.  That  is,  how does  the  location  value  of milk to  be used  at fluid plants
change  under  liberalized  trading  conditions.  Very  little  change  in  the price  surface  is
noticeable in areas far from the impacted regions.  Hence, only the Northeast and Southwest
sections  for  both the  base  case and  the  present  scenario  are displayed  in  Maps 8 and  9.
Immediately obvious is that following trade liberalization,  the price surface  levels out  as one
moves  across the border, especially  in the Northeast.  For example,  southern Quebec  and
Ontario have  a value in the range of 2 to 4  in the base  case  while just across the border in
New York and New England the value is  12 to  14.  The lower panel of Map 8 reveals that
in these same areas, the value of milk at fluid plants increases in Canada and decreases  in the
United States.  Similarly, the pronounced "U" shape  to the contours along the Texas-Mexico
border in the upper panel of  Map  9 is opened up as trade is liberalized indicating  a levelling
out of the price  surface.  In general, these maps reveal that in the affected  areas, the value of
raw milk at  fluid plants decreases  as trade is liberalized and marketing orders are unable  to
regulate the purchase  of as much of the grade A milk.
Finally, Table 1 reveals  the extent to which the blend price is reduced in those orders
impacted by trade liberalization.  The procedure  used to compute the  blend price changes is
an approximation  and in some sense  it represents  a worst case  scenario.  That is,  it assumes
that the milk diverted from U.S. fluid plants as a result of trade liberalization will  be priced
at  the  class  III  price.  This  will  indeed  be  the  case  if the  milk  gets  used  at  a  U.S.
manufacturing  plant.  However,  if the milk is procured  by a plant,  of any  type, in  either
Canada or Mexico it would presumably  be purchased at the blend price rather than the lower
class III price.  No supply would be  forthcoming if foreign plants didn't offer producers  the
blend price.  A number of other assumptions  are  also implicit  in  these  computations;  in
particular,  it is assumed that plants are regulated under only one order and that cross-hauling
does not occur.
Actual  class  I utilization  in  each of the  affected  areas  is noted  for  1993,  the year
represented by the data.  The change in the quantity  of fluid milk distributed by U.S. plants
into  each  of these  areas  is  then  used  to  calculate  the  class  I  utilization  after  trade  is
liberalized.  With this information,  and the assumptions just described,  it is a straightforward
calculation  to arrive at the resulting  blend price changes.
The range of price reductions  varies from  a low of 17 cents/cwt.  in the New York-
New Jersey and Ohio Valley orders to a high of over 90  cents in Western New York and
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New  England.  The  magnitude  of these  price  changes  is  such  that  a  good  number  of
producers  could  reasonably  be  expected  to  go  out  of business  or at  least  suffer  severe
financial  stress.  There is  a greater variation  in the  severity  of the price  decreases  in the
Northeast compared  with the Southwest although  for producers  in both regions,  such an
observation  is of little consequence.
Federal Orders Under Liberalized Trade With Regulation  of Foreign Plants
Under this scenario, the presumption  is made that all the necessary legal  mechanisms
are in place to allow administrators  of federal  orders to regulate plants located outside the
United States in cases where such plants ship class I products to U.S. markets.  In essence,
the simulation  is set up to be identical to the previous trade liberalization  scenario except that
now, shipments of fluid milk from plants in Canada and Mexico incur the class I differential
applicable  at the demand markets that they serve.  In other words,  those plants  are pooled
under the orders in which they sell class I products.
Improbably, this simulation implies that raw milk procured  from outside the United
States, as well as that procured from within the United States, is subject to regulation if the
plant  in question  ships  any  fluid  milk products  to  regulated  U.S.  markets.  There  is no
compelling reason to believe that federal orders would be at all concerned  with the price at
which foreign plants procure raw milk from local producers,  even though such milk might
be used to produce  class I products for U.S. markets.  However,  there is no way in the model
to discriminate  between milk from different sources being assembled at an arbitrary plant
when that plant is also able to ship to both foreign and U.S. markets.  This point illustrates
the difficulty  that  market administrators  would face under this type of scenario.  When a
single facility comprising a multi-product plant located outside the United States is procuring
milk from multiple sources, and that milk is commingled  before being used to produce the
variety of product types, it would be practically  impossible for U.S. auditors to determine
whether  or not  raw milk  from the United  States  is used  in the production  of fluid milk
destined  for the United States, or if it is instead used to produce  soft products, say,  for the
foreign market in which the plant operates.  Recall too that the rules of origin clauses in the
NAFTA  treaty  do  not deem  this to be  illegal  because  those  rules  only require  that raw
materials be procured from a NAFTA country, as opposed to locally.
Despite this conceptual difficulty, the simulation is performed and results are obtained
that differed only slightly from the base case.  In other words, the ability to regulate foreign
plants almost entirely  mitigates the impact of trade liberalization that would be felt in the
absence of such regulatory capability.  In the Northeast, there are no shipments of fluid milk
from  Canadian  plants to U.S.  markets  as there were  in  the previous  trade  liberalization
scenario.  In the Southwest there  are 3 such shipments  from Mexico to the United States;
354,000  cwt from Nogales to Tucson, AZ in the Central Arizona order, 567,400 cwt from
Nuevo Laredo to Laredo, TX in the Texas order, and 538,700 cwt from Ciudad Juarez to Las
Cruces, NM in the New Mexico-West Texas order.  These quantities represent,  respectively,
3.3,  1.7,  and  8.5  percent  of the total  fluid milk distributed  in  these  orders.  Given  the
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conceptual difficulty of formulating this simulation, such quantities would represent  a very
conservative  lower bound under such  a scenario.  That is, if milk procured from outside the
United States could be kept separate,  for auditing purposes,  from that procured within the
United States, then one would expect that the amount of fluid milk entering the United States
would,  at the very least, be no less, and would in fact probably be greater than the amount
suggested  here.
Under  this scenario,  no U.S.  raw milk is assembled  at Canadian  fluid plants while
1,854,092  cwt of U.S. raw milk is shipped to Mexican  fluid plants.  This amount is almost
400,000  cwt  less than  the amount  of fluid milk that Mexico  shipped  to the  United  States
implying that some of it is distributed as  fluid milk within Mexico.  There  is also  a single
shipment of raw milk from Ciudad Juarez,  Mexico to a fluid plant in Las Cruces,  NM.  A
small amount of raw milk also crossed borders,  both  Mexican and Canadian,  and  in both
directions,  to be assembled at manufacturing plants.
CONCLUSIONS
In the short run, without or before prices  equilibrate  across countries:
* immediate  free trade would be very hard on Canadian farmers; but
* not as hard on Mexican  farmers;
* price pressures will force cost-reducing structural  change.
Free trade,  after prices  re-equilibrate:
* will likely result in various combinations of commerce  between the United  States
and Canada;  but
* trade with Mexico is  likely to be larger  in total and  more dominated  by specific
products.
Free Trade  between United  States and  Canada tends to:
* turn domestic flows of west-to-east in United States and east-to-west in Canada into
* north-to-south  flows  in the East and south-to-north flows  in the West.
U.S. Class I differentials:
* distort trade incentives  along both borders; but
* the impacts  are isolated to border  areas.
Partial trade liberalization (e.g.,  specific products):
* may/will lead to further trade distortion;  and
* is not a good strategy for transition  to free trade.
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